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COMMENT
CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT OF THE REFUSE ACT:
QUI TAM PRO DOMINO REGE QUAM
PRO SE IPSO IN HOC PARTE SEQUITUR'
FLOPS; MANDAMUS NEXT?
Government apathy toward the problem of water pollution and
the recent rediscovery of the long-overlooked Refuse Act2 have
prompted conservation groups to attempt to invoke the provisions of
the Act on their own initiative. Through qui tam actions' and, most
recently,

through attempted mandamus of government agencies

charged with enforcement of the Act,4 the conservation groups have
unsuccessfully sought criminal penalties against major industrial
polluters. This comment analyzes the reasons for the failure of the
qui tam actions and the concept of prosecutorial discretion as it

relates to the success or failure of mandamus actions brought to
force government action under the Refuse Act.
The citizen-initiated actions have arisen from the wording of two
sections of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,1 both within what is
commonly known as the Refuse Act. 6 Section 411 of the Act sets up
1. "Who sues for the king as well as himself" [hereinafter qui tam]. Many old English
criminal and civil penalties were enforceable by private citizens in qui tam as well as by the
king, and private enforcement was an important weapon for gaining convictions under the
king's laws when officialdom was either remiss or unavailable. The establishment of a right
to a share of the fine as well as the right of action did much to promote the vigorous though
often overzealous enforcement of many statutes by private citizens. Abuses of the qui tam
action became so widespread, however, that the action was limited to a small number of
statutes and could only lie when specifically provided for. It was only for a brief period near
the end of the 16th Century that the action was available under a wide variety of statutes. 4
W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 356-57 (7th ed. rev. 1956); id. Vol. 9 at 236, 237,
240; and W. Blackstone, Commentaries 712, 1009 (G. Chase ed. 1890).
2. Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § § 407, 411 & 413 (1970).
3. Bass Angler Sportsman's Soc. v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.
Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom., Bass Angler Sportsmen's Soc. v. Koppers Co., 447 F.2d 1304
(5th Cir. 1971); Durning v. I.T.T. Rayonier Inc., 325 F. Supp. 446 (W.D. Wash. 1971);
Reuss v. Moss-American Inc., 323 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Bass Angler Sportsman's
Soc. v. United States Plywood-Champion Papers, 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Tex. 1971);
Matthews v. Florida Vanderbilt, 326 F. Supp. 2 (S.D. Fla. 1971); United States ex rel.
Mattson v. Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87 (D. Minn. 1971); Enquist v. Quaker Oats
Co., 327 F. Supp. 347 (D. Neb. 1971); Connecticut Action Now Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co.,
330 F. Supp. 695 (D. Conn. 1971); Gerbing v. I.T.T. Rayonier,-.F. Supp.-.(M.D. Fla.
1971); Lavignino v. Port-Mix Concrete, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 323 (D. Colo. 1971); Mitchell v.
Tenneco Chemical, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 1031 (D.S.C. 1971); Bass Angler Sportsman's Soc. v.
Scholze Tannery, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).
4. Bass Angler Sportsman's Soc. v. Scholze Tannery, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Tenn.
1971).
5. 33 U.S.C. § § 411 and 413 (1970).
6. 33 U.S.C. § § 407, 411 and 413 (1970).
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an informer's fee of half the fine 7 should the informer's information
lead to prosecution and conviction for pollution of a navigable waterway. Qui tam actions arise under Section 411, while suits seeking
writs of mandamus arise from the wording of Section 413, which
reads, in part:
The Department of Justice shall conduct the legal proceedings necessary to enforce ... this Act; and it shall be the duty of district
attorneys of the United States to vigorously prosecute all offenders
against the same whenever requested to do so by the Secretary of
War [Secretary of the Army] or by any of the officials hereinafter
designated 8 ... and for the better enforcement of the said provisions and to facilitate the detection and bringing to punishment of
such offenders, the [mentioned officers] shall have power and
authority to swear out process and to arrest... any person... who
may commit any of the acts or offenses prohibited. 9 [Emphasis
added.]
The phrase qui tam, a shortened version of the phrase qui tam
pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, identifies
the plaintiff as one "who sues on behalf of the king as well as for
himself." 1 0 The qui tam action is a relic of the Middle Ages, when
prosecutors were hard to find and officialdom was often remiss in
enforcing criminal statutes against its own members or its favorites
(although the action may be archaic, the reasons for its existence
continue).' 1 The essence of a statute which created a right in a
private citizen to bring an action in qui tam was that the citizen was
given a stake in the proceeds of the action as well as a right to bring
suit.
Interest in the qui tam action as a possible technique for use by
citizens who wished to prosecute polluters under the Refuse Act
began in 1970 when a subcommittee report to the House Committee
on Government Operations noted that "[t] he Supreme Court has
ruled that where a statute provides for a reward to the informer, the
statute authorizes him, if the Government has not previously instituted a prosecution against the violator, to institute his own suit in
7. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970).
8. The officials designated in the act are the Secretary of the Army, and "officers and
agents of the United States in charge of river and harbor improvements, and the assistant
engineers and inspectors employed under them by the authority of the Secretary of War
33
[Army], and the United States collectors of customs and other revenue officers ....
U.S.C. § 413 (1970).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 413 (1970).
10. Supra note 1.
11. See Rogers, Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse Act: A Second Chance For
Water Quality, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761 (1971).
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the name of the United States .... "12 The subcommittee's rationale
was derived from its understanding of qui tam actions and its interpretation of some dicta by Justice Black in a 1943 Supreme Court
decision. 1 The immediate effect of the report was to touch off a
series of suits by conservation groups against industrial polluters
whom the government had been unwilling to prosecute."
The federal courts confronted with the qui tam actions failed to
concur with the subcommittee's analysis and held unanimously that
qui tam actions would not lie unless specifically provided for in the
wording of the statute. The language of the court's decision in Bass
Angler Sportsman's Society v. United States Steel CorporationIs is
representative of the lack of enthusiasm with which the qui tam
actions were met:
Such an implication [that the Refuse Act created a right of action in
the informer] runs counter to the clear import of the statute which
establishes a reward but not a right of private enforcement. Such an
implication would also run contrary to fundamental principles of
criminal law ....
Plaintiffs denomination of this suit as a qui tam action adds
nothing to its right to enforce a criminal statute such as [the Refuse
Act] .... None of the many cases cited in briefs approved a qui tam
action to collect a criminal fine .... All of the qui tam cases also
recognize the statutory origin of the right of action. It arises not
from a statutory right to share in the penalty but from the express
16
or implied statutory grant of authority to maintain the action.
With some variations, and with greater and lesser degrees of historical
insight,' " the federal courts in all qui tam actions have dismissed
plaintiff's cases on similar grounds of lack of statutory authority.' 8
Although only one of the cases cited has been heard on appeal,' I the
12. House Comm. on Gov't. Operations, Our Waters and Wetlands: How the Corps of
Engineers Can Help Prevent Their Destruction and Pollution, H.R. Rep. No. 917, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1970).
13. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n. 4 (1943); Justice Black
said, "Statutes providing for a reward to informers which do not specifically either
authorize or forbid the informer to institute the action are construed to authorize him to
sue, Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch 336."
14. See note 3 supra.

15. 324 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
16. Id. at 415.
17. The most thorough discussion of the appropriateness of qui tam actions under the
Refuse Act appears in United States ex rel Mattson v. Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87
(D. Minn. 1971).
18. See note 3 supra.
19. Bass Angler Sportsman's Soc. v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.
Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Bass Angler Sportsman's Soc. v. Koppers Co., 447 F.2d 1304
(5th Cir. 1971).
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unhesitating refusal by the district courts to entertain such suits has
an air of finality.
The unusually strong wording of the Refuse Act has, however, led
at least one conservation group to look beyond qui tam to mandamus. In Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc. v. Scholze Tannery, Inc.,2 °
the plaintiff amended its qui tam complaint to request a writ of
mandamus against the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of the Army
Corps of Engineers and the Justice Department. 2 1 The plaintiffs
alleged that under the terms of the Refuse Act the Army and the
Engineers had a duty to set standards for the issuance of permits for
dumping in waterways, 2 2 and that, once informed of a violation, the
Justice Department had a non-discretionary duty to prosecute. To
this the court replied that the duties of the Army and the Engineers
were discretionary under the terms of the Act and that the discretion
of the Attorney General and the Justice Department to prosecute
was absolute. 3
Given the elements of mandamus - a clear right on the part of the
plaintiff and a non-discretionary, "ministerial" duty on the part of
the official - the court's conclusion in Bass Angler appears correct.
However, the law of mandamus is perhaps not as strict as the court
suggests and it is at least arguable that Congress did not intend the
Justice Department to have such a free hand in deciding whether or
not to prosecute.
Courts in the past have recognized that every discretion has its
abuse and mandamus may lie to correct such an abuse. Issuance of
writs of mandamus may depend, where discretion is the issue, upon
the determination by the court of whether such facts exist that a
discretionary duty-ordinarily immune from mandamus-may have
become non-discretionary by sheer weight of evidence in favor of
performing the requested act. 4
20. 329 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).
21. Id. at 342.
22. Id.
23. "As the Court has heretofore observed, the direction of the Attorney General in
choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute criminal violations is absolute and
mandamus will not be to control the free exercise of this discretion." Id. at 350.
24. Roberts v. United States, 176 U.S. 221 (1900); Ott v. U.S. Board of Parole, 324 F.
Supp. 1034 (W.D. Mo., 1971); Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee v. Hoover, 327 F.
Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Parrott v. Cary, 234 F. Supp. 572 (D. Colo. 1964); Grace Line,
Inc. v. Panama Canal Co., 143 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Chesley v. Jones, 81 Ariz. 1,
299 P.2d 179 (1956); Arizona State Highway Commission v. Superior Court, 81 Ariz. 74,
299 P.2d 783 (1956); Manjares v. Newton, 49 Cal. Rptr. 805, 411 P.2d 901 (1966);
Albonico v. Madera Irrigation District, 3 Cal. Rptr. 343, 350 P.2d 95 (1960); Le Strange v.
City of Berkeley, 26 Cal. Rptr. 550 (Ct. App. 1962); State ex rel. Torrance v. City of
Shreveport, 231 La. 840, 93 So. 2d 187 (1957); De Matteo v. O'Connell, 166 N.Y.S. 2d

938 (1957).
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The Attorney General's prosecutorial discretion may be thought
to be absolute in most areas in which he is charged with enforcement
duties: However, the various statutes which have established the
spheres of Justice Department authority suggest that Congress has
not intended the discretion to be absolute in all areas."5 While the
wording of most legislation granting prosecutorial powers to the
Justice Department also grants wide prosecutorial discretion,2 6 the
wording of some such legislation appears, at least on its face, to
attempt to limit the Justice Department's discretion.2
For example, compare the Textile Fiber Products Identification
Act 2 8 with the Wool Labeling Act. 2 9 The two acts are worded
similarly except in the enforcement provisions. In the case of the
Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, the charge to the Justice
Department appears to grant wide discretion, while the wording of
the Wool Labeling Act suggests that the Justice Department's discretion in enforcing the provisions dealing with wool labeling was at
least intended to be strictly circumscribed. The wording in the
Textile Act reads:
Whenever the [Federal Trade] Commission has reason to believe
that any person is guilty of a misdemeanor under this section, it may
certify all pertinent facts to the Attorney General. If, on the basis of
such facts certified, the Attorney General concurs in such belief, it
shall be his duty to cause appropriate proceedings to be
brought.... 3 o [Emphasis added.]
The corresponding section of the Wool Labeling Act reads:
Whenever the Commission has reason to believe any person is guilty
of a misdemeanor under this section, it shall certify all pertinent
facts to the Attorney General, whose duty it shall be to cause appropriate proceedings to be brought.... 3 1 [Emphasis added.]
Even the above-quoted wording of the Textile Act is stronger than
25. The following are examples of statutes which appear to attempt to limit the discretion of the Attorney General: Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 224 (1970);
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 4991 (1970); Wool Labeling Act, 15
U.S.C. § 68h (1970); Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 401(c) (1964).
26. Examples of statutes which appear to give the Attorney General broad prosecutorial
discretion are: Interstate Commerce in Seeds Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970); Textile Fiber
Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. § 70i (1970); Federal Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2101(d) (1970); Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1970); Pandering Advertisements
Act, 39 U.S.C. § 3008(d) (1970).
27. See note 23 supra.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 70i (1970).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 68h (1970).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 70i (1970).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 68h (1970).
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some enforcement provisions. The Interstate Land Sales Act, for
example, reads:
The Secretary [of Housing and Urban Development] may transmit
such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices
to the Attorney General who may, in his discretion, institute the
appropriate criminal proceedings.... 3 2 [Emphasis added.]
In reviewing the various acts granting authority to the Attorney General, the strongest wording found is in the Refuse Act, cited above.
The question remains, of course, whether the doctrine of separation
of powers 3 3 would permit Congress to legislate varying degrees of
prosecutorial discretion in the Justice Department. At least one federal judge felt that the wording of the Act was so strong that it
successfully limited the discretion of both agency and prosecutor in
carrying out the terms of the Act:
The provisions of Section 406 [of the Rivers and Harbors Act] must
be construed in connection with all other provisions of Title 33,
[the Rivers and Harbors Act] giving effect to each, so as to make a
harmonious whole, since they all relate to the same subject matter.
Such consideration will show that the respective use of the mandatory "shall be," and the permissive "may be," is deliberate and
purposeful on the part of the Congress. The mandatory "shall be" is
used in sections 1 and 413 [quoted on page 299] so as to require the
Secretary of War to adopt and publish appropriate regulations, to
require various federal officers charged with their enforcement to
arrest all violators, and to require all district attorneys to prosecute
them; no discretion is to be exercised in these respects.34 [Emphasis
added.]
Nevertheless, the court in the more recent case of Bass Anglers
Sportsman's Society v. Scholze Tannery, Inc.,35 refused even to
consider the possibility that the Justice Department's prosecutorial
discretion was anything less than absolute, even under the strong
wording of the Refuse Act. Given the language of the Act, 3 6 the
court's holding must be taken to mean that Congress is without the
power to so "constrict" the Justice Department in this manner.
There is ample case law supporting this holding.3" However, it is
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (1970).
33. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law 104,105, 130 (1956).
34. South Carolina ex rel. Maybank v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 41 F. Supp.
111, 118 (E.D.S.C. 1941).
35. 329 F. Supp. 339_(E.D. Tenn. 1971).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 413 (1970).

37. Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 454 (1869); Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d
243 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965); Powell v. Katzenbach, 355 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1965).
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questionable whether the Executive has this type of blanket discretion in deciding whether or not to carry out the terms of an act of
Congress. The separation of powers doctrine dictates that Congress
refrain from tying the executive's hands when he is engaged in purely
executive functions.' 8 It is another matter, however, when Congress,
as with the Refuse Act, has delegated powers to the Executive and
the Executive appears to subvert the intent of the act. Here again
the separation of powers doctrine applies, but this time it dictates
that the Executive act only within the terms of the act, neither
expanding nor contracting the mandate. 3 9 Apparently the Justice
Department has developed guidelines for enforcing the Refuse Act
which emasculate the provisions of the Act almost entirely.4 0 It is
arguable that it is beyond the power of the Executive, under the
guise of prosecutorial discretion, to formally constrict the provisions
of an act of Congress in this manner. The doctrine of separation of
powers dictates, in this respect, that any rules set up by the executive
pursuant to an act of Congress must be consistent with the act:
...

Congress must tell the President what he can do by prescribing a

standard which confines his discretion and which will guarantee that
any authorized action he takes will tend to promote rather than
flout the legislative purpose. 4
This is not to suggest that the discretion of the Attorney General
or his subordinates is not absolute insofar as it extends to a factual
determination that a criminal prosecution is or is not capable of
being maintained. To limit this type of discretion would be to tell
the Attorney General to conduct prosecutions for their harrassment
value alone.
There is a second facet of the Justice Department's discretion,
however, the Department's political discretion. This is the discretion
which allows the Department to refuse to prosecute simply because
it doesn't want to prosecute. This protects the Executive's ability to
make those "practical" decisions of who to sue when. The Justice
Department's self-imposed guidelines for prosecuting under the Refuse Act, mentioned above, reflect the Department's desire to sue
when and where it chooses and to be able to decline to prosecute for
38. 16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 130 (1956).
39. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); United States v.
Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320
(1907); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192
U.S. 470 (1904); In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526 (1897); Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States,
47 C.C.P.A. 52 (1959).
40. Supra note 11, at 799-806.
41. Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 47 C.C.P.A. 52, 60 (1959).
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the flimsiest of reasons.4 2 It seems, however, that this is precisely
the type of discretion which Congress attempted to limit when it put
in the Act the phrase ". . . it shall be the duty of United States
attorneys to vigorously prosecute all offenders against [the Refuse
Act ] ....
There is much court language to the effect that the prosecutorial
discretion of the Justice Department is absolute. As Judge Brown
stated in his concurring opinion in United States v. Cox, "All must
be aware now that there are times when the interests of the nation
require that a prosecution be foregone." 4 4 The rationale behind this
holding is at best obscure. In the case of the Refuse Act it seems in
direct conflict with the intent of an act of Congress. In the Bass
Angler attempt at mandamus the court did nothing more than put
forth the assertion that the discretion of the Justice Department,
even under the Refuse Act, was absolute. 4 1 This simple assertion
begs the question of whether Congress is capable of limiting the
political aspects of discretion and, if so, to what extent the Refuse
Act has done so. It is worth noting that some state courts have held
that there are circumstances under which district attorneys must
prosecute, like it or not. 4 6 Given the recent recognition of citizens'
interest in their environment, federal courts should be more willing
to inquire into the responsibilities of the Executive.
JOHN BOYD

42. Supra note 11, at 799-806.
43. 33 U.S.C. § 413 (1970).
44. 342 F.2d 167, 182 (5th Cir. 1965).
45. 329 F. Supp. at 349-50 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).
46. See Blankenship v. Michalski, 155 Cal. App. 2d 853, 318 P.2d 727 (1957); O'Donnell
v. Board of Appeals of Billerica, 349 Mass. 324, 207 N.E. 2d 877 (1965); City of Haverhill
v. DiBurro, 337 Mass. 230, 148 N.E. 2d 642 (1957); Perazzo v. Lindsay, 55 Misc. 2d 767,
286 N.Y.S. 2d 309 (1967); Miles-Lee Auto Supply Co. v. Bellows, 260 Ohio 2d 452, 197
N.E. 2d 247 (1964).

